

























t the end of 2010, the Canadian mortgage 
market had grown to more than $1 trillion, 
representing almost 40 per cent of total out-
standing private sector credit. The market is domin-
ated by Canada’s six major banks, although this has 
not always been the case. Their most recent increase 
in market share coincides with changes to the Bank 
Act in 1992, which allowed chartered banks to enter 
the trust business. They did this largely through acqui-
sition.
1 Recent research at the Bank of Canada has 
analyzed the Canadian mortgage market in this con-
text. The purpose of the research is to understand 
how the interaction of market structure, product dif-
ferentiation, and information frictions determines rates 
in the Canadian mortgage market. This article sum-
marizes the main findings.
Understanding how rates are determined in the 
Canadian mortgage market is important for the cen-
tral bank, competition authorities, and financial regu-
lation. For example, the gap between posted rates 
and transaction rates should be taken into account 
when addressing some questions about the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism. Do financial institu-
tions fully pass through changes in monetary policy 
rates to mortgage rates, and do they move equally 
fast from above and below equilibrium? Using posted 
rates, Allen and McVanel (2009) find that the answer to 
the first question is no and to the second, yes. But 
using transaction rates, they find that the answer to 
the first question is yes and to the second, no.
The changing market structure of the mortgage 
industry has implications for competition, but the 
analysis is complicated because banks are vertically 
and horizontally differentiated. For example, the loca-
tion of branches determines the cost of shopping for 
mortgages (horizontal differentiation), while the quality 
of complementary services affects the value of 
1  See Freedman (1998) for a discussion of the evolution of deregulation in Canada.
*  I have benefited from discussions with and comments from Ian Christensen, Robert Clark, 
Toni Gravelle, Darcey McVanel, Larry Schembri, and Mark Zelmer.
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The Canadian mortgage market is relatively simple 
and conservative, particularly when compared with its 
U.S. counterpart (kiff 2009). Many Canadians sign 
five-year, fixed-rate mortgages that are rolled over 
with new five-year, fixed-rate contracts for the life of 
the mortgage—typically 25 years (the amortization 
period).
3 The rate is renegotiated every five years. The 
popularity of variable-rate mortgages has waxed and 
waned over time. in this case, the monthly payment is 
typically fixed, but the portion that is interest and not 
principal changes with fluctuations in interest rates. 
Longer-term mortgages, which are the norm in the 
United States, were phased out of Canada in the late 
1960s after lenders experienced difficulties with vola-
tile interest rates and maturity mismatch.
3  The percentage of mortgages with longer amortization periods has increased in recent 
years. In the sample period covered by the analysis (1992 to 2004), however, almost 
every mortgage was amortized over 25 years. 
signing with a particular bank (vertical differentiation). 
if consumers differ in their preferences for these ser-
vices, then changes in market structure can have 
welfare effects that are more complex than those 
typically assumed in merger analysis.
Financial regulators should also take a keen interest in 
understanding how lenders price mortgages, espe-
cially if mortgage-related instruments are to be 
included under the umbrella of “system-wide pruden-
tial regulation.” For example, the effectiveness of 
changing the rules governing mortgage lending 
depends on how lenders and borrowers negotiate 
rates. The research summarized here shows that 
borrowers do not simply take the posted rate as given. 
This article first provides a brief examination of the 
Canadian mortgage market, focusing on the evolution 
of the market following legislative changes to the Bank 
Act in 1992. This is followed by an overview of the 
data, which is noteworthy in its own right because it is 
very detailed. key research by the Bank of Canada on 
the Canadian mortgage market is then reviewed.
The Canadian Mortgage Market
Canada’s mortgage market is dominated by the “Big 
Six” Canadian banks: Bank of Montreal, Bank of nova 
Scotia, Banque nationale, Canadian imperial Bank of 
Commerce, Royal Bank Financial group, and TD 
Bank Financial group. Together with a large regional 
co-operative network—the Desjardins Movement—
and a provincially owned deposit-taking institution—
Alberta’s ATB Financial—this group controls 90 per 
cent of the assets in the banking industry. Collectively, 
these institutions are called the “Big eight.” Chart 1 
presents their market share of outstanding mort-
gages, which grew from 60 per cent to 80 per cent 
between 1992 and 2004 (the period for which we have 
detailed data and conduct the majority of our analysis) 
as banks entered the trust business. They all offer the 
same types of mortgage products, as well as other 
products, such as credit cards, personal loans, and 
wealth-management advice. in fact, most Canadians 
treat their primary financial institution as a “one-stop 
shop” (universal bank) where they purchase the 
majority of their financial services. This article argues 
that this is one reason why Canadian banks compete 
so fiercely in the mortgage market: a lender has many 
opportunities for cross-product selling once a client is 
locked in with a mortgage.
2 in addition to the large 
2  Consumers are said to be “locked in” if they do not switch to a seller offering a lower price. 
This is because there are costs to switching sellers, in terms of financial costs and effort. 
Chart 1:  Market share of Canada’s major mortgage 
lenders
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total, over 50 per cent of the mortgages on the bal-
ance sheets of financial institutions are insured—a 
proportion that has been relatively stable over time. 
The insurers charge the lender a premium for insur-
ance that protects the lender in case of borrower 
default. Typically, a lender will pass this cost on to the 
borrower. To assess a loan for mortgage insurance, 
CMhC and genworth Financial collect detailed infor-
mation on the borrower and the property—information 
related to the mortgage contract and to the borrower’s 
ability and history in managing their debts, including 
information on incomes and credit scores. information 
related to the contract includes the interest rate nego-
tiated between the lender and the borrower. The dif-
ference between the contract rate and the posted rate 
is the discount. There is also information on house 
prices and loan amounts and, therefore, loan-to-value 
(LTV) ratios. Collectively, these data help the Bank to 
understand how mortgages rates are determined in 
Canada.
Discounting
Allen, Clark, and houde (2011) are the first to use data 
at the individual level to document the use of mort-
gage discounting in Canada. Discounting is a situation 
where sellers, in this case lenders, post one rate but 
are willing to negotiate a different rate. The practice 
began in earnest in the early 1990s and is considered 
the norm in today’s mortgage market. in its annual 
report on the state of the residential mortgage market, 
the Canadian Association of Accredited Mortgage 
professionals (CAAMp) indicated that in 2009 the 
average consumer received a discount of 123 basis 
points on a five-year, fixed-rate mortgage. A natural 
question to ask might be why lenders post high rates 
if they are going to offer discounts to the majority of 
consumers. Allen, Clark, and houde (2011) argue that 
over time lenders have improved their ability to price 
discriminate, that is, to offer discount rates to different 
sets of consumers based on their willingness to pay. 
Lenders can thus increase their profits through price 







Although the 1990s saw the large Canadian banks 
acquire nearly all of the country’s trust companies, 
there were a number of important developments in 
the mortgage industry that encouraged competition. 
For example, mortgage brokers became important 
participants in the lending process. Brokers typically 
earn between 1 and 1.3 per cent of the value of mort-
gages that they bring to a lender, which could be 
anything from a small deposit-taking institution to a 
large bank. Chart 2 presents the share of trans-
actions that were broker assisted over an eight-year 
sample period. The share increases from less than 
10 per cent to over 30 per cent between 1997 and 
2004.
4 This suggests that a large number of con-
sumers sought the help of a broker when shopping for 
a mortgage. in addition to mortgage brokers, foreign 
competitors entered the Canadian banking market, 
although their market share remains small.
The Data: Mortgage Insurers
The data used in this research are provided by the 
Canada Mortgage and housing Corporation (CMhC) 
and genworth Financial, Canada’s two mortgage 
insurers over the course of the sample period, which 
runs from 1992 to 2004 (consent for the Bank of 
Canada to access the data was provided by individual 
financial institutions). During this time, borrowers who 
contributed less than 25 per cent to the purchase 
price of a house were required to purchase mortgage 
insurance (today that number is 20 per cent). The 
majority of borrowers are insured by the CMhC, but 
4  Survey evidence from CAAMP post-2004 shows the market share of mortgage brokers 
reaching as high as 40 per cent in 2008, before falling to 35 per cent in 2009. 
Chart 2:  Broker-assisted transactions
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imply that consumers prefer banks with an extensive 
branch network and are therefore willing to pay more 
to do business with such a bank.
The results also indicate that, ceteris paribus, higher-
income households pay higher rates, on average, than 
lower-income households. High-income households 
are likely less inclined to spend the time shopping for 
and negotiating a mortgage. Since information on the 
age of the borrowers was not available, proxies are 
used: previous homeowners are classified as the oldest 
category, current renters as the middle category, and 
mortgage applicants living with their parents as the 
youngest category. The results show that the youngest 
borrowers receive the largest rate discount. This is 
consistent with the larger literature on price discrimin-
ation (e.g., Goldberg 1996) since banks, like most firms, 
try hard to attract new, younger customers because 
they can potentially lock them in for a long period.
Chart 3 illustrates the evolution of discounting from 
1992 to 2004 for the five-year, fixed-rate mortgage. 
Over this period (and, according to survey data, beyond 
this period), discounting increased. However, the 
markup in the posted rate also rose, so that the 
average margin between the transaction rate and the 
five-year bond rate (which proxies the cost of funding) 
is relatively constant over time. Chart 4 shows the 
dispersion in the discounts over periods 1992–95 and 
2000–02. In both periods, different borrowers paid 
different rates, but more so in the latter period. 
Therefore, although the average consumer is as well 
off under a zero-discount environment as they are in a 
high-discount environment, the increased use and 
magnitude of discounting hides the fact that some 
types of borrowers experience gains while others are 
worse off.
Allen, Clark, and Houde (2011) examine factors that 
might explain differences in mortgage rates. The key 
variables considered are loan, borrower, and market 
characteristics. They also control for time trends and 
unobservable characteristics of the banks and neigh-
bourhoods that do not change over time. Allen, Clark, 
and Houde find that over the period 1999 to 2004 
consumers living in less-competitive markets (high 
Branch HHI) pay higher rates than consumers living in 
competitive markets.
5 In addition, banks with large 
branch networks charge higher rates than banks with 
smaller branch networks. This could be because more 
5  HHI stands for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. It is the sum of the square of the share of 
each bank’s branches in a market. The result ranges from 0 to 1, where a low number 
indicates that the market is highly competitive, and a high number indicates that the 
market is not competitive.
Chart 3:  Evolution of mortgage rates in Canada
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Canada. Since discounting has increased over time, a 
downward bias potentially exists in previous meas-
ures of pass-through. Taking into account the upward 
trend in discounting and using data from 1991 to 
2007, Allen and McVanel show that pass-through is 





once discounting is controlled for, however, the 
authors uncover another interesting facet of mortgage 
rates. They find that in the short, run five of the six 
largest Canadian banks adjust their rates upward 
more quickly when there are upward cost pressures 
than downward when costs fall.
6 There are a few 
reasons why there might be an asymmetric price 
response to changes in input costs. First, if banks 
have some market power, there is scope for banks to 
coordinate implicitly or explicitly. if costs rise, then 
banks will all want to increase their prices. if costs fall, 
however, there is an incentive to wait before passing 
on the lower costs in the form of lower rates because 
all the banks can earn higher profits. Second, if 
search is costly, banks can maintain high rates even 
after their costs have fallen because it takes time for 
mortgage shoppers to realize that rates should have 
fallen. The difference between posted rates and trans-
action rates in this market is further evidence that 
search costs are important.
Mergers
Most researchers that examine the effect of competi-
tion on prices take the same approach as Allen, Clark, 
and houde (2011). That is, they regress prices on a 
measure of concentration. This approach does not 
directly address the effects of competition on mortgage 
rates, however, but measures correlation. The positive 
correlation between mortgage rates and branch con-
centration strongly suggests that rates are higher in 
6  This is in line with previous research on the U.S. mortgage market (Arbatskaya and 
Baye 2004) or the market for deposits (Hannan and Berger 1991). More generally, 
Peltzman (2000) finds asymmetric price adjustments in most consumer and producer 
prices that he examines. Anecdotally, the Bank of Montreal’s chief economist was 
quoted in The Globe and Mail (18 November 2009) as saying, “It’s a safe thing to say 
that [mortgage] interest rates tend to move higher a lot faster than they move lower.”
with respect to LTV ratios, which are discussed in the 
Box on page 6, the authors find that borrowers who 
make the minimum down payment pay a rate pre-
mium over those able to put more equity into the 
house. Borrowers with larger equity in their houses 
have better bargaining positions than borrowers with 
minimum equity. Lenders compete for these bor-
rowers more fiercely not only because they are less 
risky, but also because they are more profitable. 
Borrowers with more equity in the house are more 
likely to be in a position to take advantage of the lend-
er’s complementary services (such as wealth man-
agement or personal loans) than the most financially 
constrained borrowers and are thus more attractive to 
lenders. Lenders must therefore compete for this type 
of borrower by offering them larger discounts, while 
the most constrained borrowers pay a premium.
The authors also find that borrowers with better credit 
scores receive larger discounts. Banks also offer 
larger discounts to new clients than to existing clients. 
Consumers willing to switch financial institutions when 
shopping for their mortgage will see, on average, an 
additional discount of 7 basis points from the posted 
rate. The results also indicate that borrowers who use a 
mortgage broker pay less, on average, than borrowers 
who negotiate with lenders directly. This average dis-
count is about an additional 19 basis points.
Finally, the authors find that a substantial amount of 
discounting cannot be explained by observable char-
acteristics. The results are consistent, however, with 
a model of consumer heterogeneity in search and 
bargaining efforts/abilities, where the latter is unob-
served. Borrowers who both search for and bargain 
more intensively with lenders can achieve larger 
discounts than other borrowers.
Discounting and monetary policy
Mortgage-rate discounting has implications for the 
transmission of monetary policy (Allen and McVanel 
2009). Central banks rely on assumptions about the 
rate of pass-through of changes in the Bank rate to 
lending rates because it affects how much they 
should raise or lower rates when macroeconomic 
conditions change. These assumptions are usually 
based on estimates using historical data—typically 
the average posted mortgage rates. Allen and 
McVanel show that ignoring Canadian mortgage-
discounting practices leads to a significant underesti-
mation of pass-through. That is, if discounts are not 
factored in, Canadian lenders appear to be extremely 
slow to pass on changes in the Bank Rate to their 
customers. As noted earlier, however, discounting is 
5 
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by the appraised value of the house at the time of 
the loan. Currently, mortgages with an LTV ratio 
below 80 are conventional mortgages that do not 
require mortgage insurance. Those with LTV 
ratios above 80 require insurance, which is pro-
vided by CMhC or genworth Financial. The max-
imum allowable LTV ratio in Canada is 95 per 
cent. A borrower can therefore contribute 5 per 
cent of their own equity to borrow 95 per cent of 
the purchase price from a lender for the purpose 
of buying a house. Since the 2007 U.S. subprime-
mortgage crisis, LTV ratios have become an 
important source of discussion as a potential tool 
for system-wide risk management (e.g., CgFS 
2010). Requiring borrowers to increase the 
amount of equity that they contribute when pur-
chasing a house (e.g., lowering the maximum LTV 
ratio from 95 to 90), would likely have a damp-
ening effect on house prices in the short-run. This 
is because in the short run fewer people would 
enter the housing market, and those who did 
would buy less-expensive houses.
1
Chart A shows the LTV ratios of insured bor-
rowers over two periods, 1992 to 1998 and 1998 
to 2003, that correspond to two different insur-
ance-premium regimes. in both cases, the 
majority of households are clustered at LTV ratios 
of 90 and 95, suggesting that most insured bor-
rowers are highly leveraged. Changes to the max-
imum LTV ratio are thus likely to affect a large 
share of new insured mortgages. in 1998, the 
cost to the borrower of insuring a 95 LTV mort-
gage relative to a 90 LTV mortgage increased by 
50 per cent. This led some borrowers to increase 
the equity portion of their mortgage, since the 
fraction of borrowers in the 95 LTV bin fell, and 
the fraction of borrowers in the 90 LTV bin 
increased. This suggests that, in addition to 
altering the LTV ratio, changes to mortgage-
insurance premiums have the potential to infl  u-
ence household decisions to take on increased 
leverage. 
1  Note that a quality-based house price index might actually increase if consum-
ers drive up the value of low-quality houses, even though the value of more 
expensive houses is falling because of the policy.
Loan-to-Value Ratios
Chart A: Loan to value ratio at time of issuance
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sents estimates from the following regression, which 
allows for the effect of the merger to vary across 
different markets:
    (2)
where   is the herfindahl-hirschman measure of 
branch concentration.
here we see that rates in the most competitive neigh-
bourhoods fell after the merger, while they increased 





The aggregate results can be explained once the 
merger effect is broken down into its two compon-
ents: the direct effect, which is the rate impact on the 
set of consumers who banked with the merging insti-
tutions pre- and post-merger, and the indirect effect, 
which is the rate impact on the set of consumers who 
banked with the merging institution’s competitors 
pre- and post- merger. The estimating equation is 
given by:
       (3)
less-competitive markets, but there might be some 
unobservable reason for the correlation. Another 
approach is to look at mergers to directly measure the 
effects of changes in local market competition on 
rates. in this section, we follow this strategy by exam-
ining the impact of a merger between a bank and a 
trust company.
in the 1990s, Canadian banks acquired virtually all of 
the existing trust companies, together with hundreds 
of their branches across the country.
7 Consequently, 
these mergers and acquisitions created a discrete 
change in the structure of local banking markets. in 
particular, when two neighbouring branches merge 
because of a national acquisition, competition in the 
local market is immediately reduced, since banks 
begin internalizing the impact of their actions on each 
other’s profits. That is, branches that once competed 
stop doing so once the merger is announced.
8
Since most Canadian mortgage shoppers negotiate 
their contracts directly with local bankers, the poten-
tial impact of a merger is determined by the number of 
available local bank branches. Therefore, the most 
direct approach is to study the impact on rates of 
removing lender options from the choice set of con-
sumers.
9 The effect of this change in competition on 
rates is captured by comparing the rates paid by the 
consumers affected by the merger (“treated”) with 
those paid by a base group as follows:
  (1)
where   is the discount;   is equal to 1 if household 
 has the merging institutions in its neighbourhood 
and 0 otherwise;   indexes the merger and is there-
fore equal to 1 post-merger and equal to 0 pre-
merger; and   is the coefficient of interest, which 
captures the aggregate effect of the merger on prices. 
Table 1 summarizes the key results. From column (1) 
it is clear that overall the merger did not have a signifi-
cant impact on rates. The coefficient is small, about 
1.6 basis points, and not statistically significant. in 
7  Examples include TD-Central Guaranty Trust (1992), Royal Bank-Royal Trust (1993), 
BMO-Household Trust (1995), CIBC-FirstLine Trust (1995), Scotiabank-National Trust 
(1997), and TD-Canada Trust (2000).
8  For an econometrician trying to identify the effects of competition on prices, these 
changes in competition can be viewed as exogenous to the local market conditions. 
9  The impact on rates of removing one bank option can be identified because not all 
consumers face the same bank options. Some consumers live in markets offering many 
bank choices, including the two merging banks, while others live in markets containing 
neither of the merging banks or only one of them. The last two groups of consumers 
are not affected by the merger and therefore constitute the base group. The first set 
of consumers (“treated”) is affected by the merger, since their shopping options are 
reduced post-merger.
Table 1:  Effects of mergers on mortgage rates
Variables Equation (1) Equation (2) Equation (3)





Aggregate effect X HHI     0.184†
  (0.0695)
Bank-speciﬁ  c effects
Merging FIs   0.0850†
  (0.0166)
Competing FIs   - 0.0342†
  (0.0108)
† Signifi  cant at 1 per cent
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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This article summarizes key research on the Canadian 
mortgage market currently being undertaken at the 
Bank of Canada in conjunction with external aca-
demics. overall, the findings are consistent with a 
model where consumers have different preferences 
and skills when shopping and bargaining for a mort-
gage and where lenders maximize profits based on 
observing these preferences and skills. The results 
indicate that high-income borrowers pay more for 
their mortgages, as do loyal consumers, consumers 
who search less, and those that value large branch 
networks. Unobserved bargaining ability also appears 
to play an important role in determining mortgage 
rates.
Results also suggest that mortgage-rate discounting 
affects the speed and amount of pass-through of 
changes in the central bank’s policy rate to mortgage 
rates. in particular, once discounting is taken into 
account, the major mortgage lenders in Canada are 
slower to cut rates than to increase them. This asym-
metry has implications for monetary policy because it 
means that the actions of the central bank might need 
to be adjusted, depending on whether it is cutting or 
increasing interest rates. The reasons for the asym-
metric responses of mortgage lenders should also be 
investigated.
Finally, this research suggests that bank mergers can 
lead to asymmetric effects on mortgage rates. The 
merging parties, because of market power, can 
increase rates, while the competition actually 
decreases rates in order to attract consumers. This 
result is non-standard in the industrial-organization 
literature where both sets of lenders would typically 
increase prices because of market power. given the 
preference of consumers for factors other than low 
rates (e.g., branch-network size), however, the com-
petitors actually decrease rates, because post-merger 
they are relatively smaller than the merging entities in 
terms of their branch network.
Together, these findings are important to the central 
bank and to competition authorities because of their 
impact on our understanding of the factors affecting 
competition and the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism.
where   is an indicator variable for whether or not the 
lender is one of the merging institutions or one of its 
competitors. The coefficients of interest are  , since 
these capture the merger effects.
The results suggest an interesting asymmetry. 
Consumers dealing with the merging bank saw a 
significant increase in rates post-merger—about 
8.5 basis points—while consumers dealing with the 
competition saw rate decreases, by approximately 
3.4 basis points.
The results suggest at least two channels of influence 
from the merger. The asymmetric price responses 
could be explained by a quality increase. if the 
merged bank provides higher-quality service (e.g., a 
larger network of branches and ATM machines), then, 
ceteris	paribus, it can charge higher rates and still 
attract customers, while its competitors must offer 
larger discounts. An alternative interpretation of the 
price results (perhaps complementarily) is that banks 
in neighbourhoods that experienced a merger might 
be attracting a different mix of consumers. For 
instance, by exerting a larger degree of price control, 
the new entity might be less likely to attract con-
sumers willing to shop intensively for their mortgages. 
This would explain the result that rates are higher at 
the merging bank and lower at the competing banks. 
The asymmetric price effect of the merger suggests 
that the relationship between bankers and consumers 
is complicated. The merging banks are able to raise 
rates post-merger, extracting more from borrowers 
than pre-merger. given that the mortgage is the lar-
gest purchase for most households, the costs of the 
merger are not negligible. These borrowers value 
more than the price of the mortgage, however, 
because they have the option of paying a lower rate at 
a competing lender in the same neighbourhood. 
Competition agencies may want to consider this 
possibility in analyzing any future mergers.
8
CoMpeTiTion in The CAnADiAn MoRTgAge MARkeT
BAnk oF CAnADA ReView     winTeR 2010–2011Literature Cited
Allen, J., R. Clark, and J.-F. houde. 2011. “Discounting; 
in Mortgage Markets.” Bank of Canada working 
paper no. 2011-3.
Allen, J. and D. McVanel. 2009. “price Movements in 
the Canadian Residential Mortgage Market.” Bank 
of Canada working paper no. 2009-13. 
Arbatskaya, M. and M. Baye. 2004. “Are prices 
‘Sticky’ online? Market Structure effects and 
Asymmetric Responses to Cost Shocks in online 
Mortgage Markets.” International	Journal	of	
Industrial	Organization 22 (10): 1443–62.
Committee on the global Financial System (CgFS). 
2010. “Macroprudential instruments and 
Frameworks: A Stocktaking of issues and 
experiences.” CgFS papers no. 38.
Freedman, C. 1998. “The Canadian Banking System.” 
Bank of Canada Technical Report no. 81.
goldberg, p. 1996. “Dealer price Discrimination in 
new Car purchases: evidence from the Consumer 
expenditure Survey.” Journal	of	Political	Economy 
104 (3): 622–54.
hannan, T. and A. Berger. 1991. “The Rigidity of 
prices: evidence from the Banking industry.” 
American	Economic	Review 81 (4): 938–45.
kiff, J. 2009. “Canadian Residential Mortgage 
Markets: Boring But effective?” iMF working 
paper no. 09/130.
peltzman, S. 2000. “prices Rise Faster Than They 
Fall.” Journal	of	Political	Economy 108 (3): 
466–502.
9 
CoMpeTiTion in The CAnADiAn MoRTgAge MARkeT
BAnk oF CAnADA ReView     winTeR 2010–2011